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THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION, AND
THE GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR SOL
DIERS AND SAILORS..

I.

THE COURSE AND CONDUCT OF THE WAR'.
A wise maxim of the greatest general of antiquity prescribes that we'
should esteem nothing done till all is done; but it is probable that its
intent is rather to point out the danger of that indolent dwelling on the
deeds of tte past which shuts out of view the duties and demands of
the present, than to discourage (especially when a great task is laid
upon a nation) such a retrospect of what has already been accom
plished as will inspire courage for carrying it through to the end.
The country has lately passed through that trying experience whichhistory shows is sure to come upon a people plunged into a great war,a period when the first popular enthusiasm having died out, the bur-dens and the bereavements of the war are brought keenly home to all,!
and a reaction of general despondency results. In this mood of the
public mind men forget that while they have suffered the enemy also’
has suffered in an equal or even greater degree, and that too, perhaps,
without the same ability to sustain his losses; they forget while dwell
ing on their own defeats, that every victory they have won has been
an equally sore defeat to the enemy. When this time comes then
comes the test of the mettle of a people. If weak they sink under it;
but the great-minded rise up stronger for the ordeal.
The feeling of depression which but lately prevailed regarding the
seemingly indefinite prolongation of the war, and which is still felt by
some, is a singular repetition of an experience which ^as frequently
been felt by other nations conducting a long war. It has often hap
pened that men on the very eve of the conclusion of a war have
locked upon it as promising the longest duration ; and it will be in
the memory of many that just previous to the termination of the Urimean war, even as sagacious an observer as Mr. Cobden had just con
cluded proving in a pamphlet that it was certain to be prolonged for
many years. It thus frequently happens that war, which in its prac
tical execution deals so largely in deception, is itself the greatest of
deceptions. When after years, perhaps, of strife, great armies still con
front each other, it is hard to penetrate its outlet or issue ; but some
sudden turn of affairs precipitates the catastrophe long preparing and
in the flames of a Waterloo, a Cannse, or a Pultowa, fabrics and systems seemingly firm-rooted and imperishable go out in ashes and
nothingness.
At the outbreak of the rebellion the public mind became possessed
with illusive anticipations that the war would be $ short one—that
our victorious columns sweeping the rebels before them in their tm-

umphant path would, in a few months at most, end by precipitating
them into the Gulf of Mexico. This was a great delusion no doubt;
but it was not more so than that other sentiment which has arisen
as the natural reaction after the rude shock this hope received—the
error as to the indefinite prolongation of the war. The one fallacy is
as pernicious as the other; for if the first was a great bar to the effi
cient execution of the duty of putting down the rebellion (and there is
doubt that our illusions as to the ease and speediness with which
the v vor^ would be accomplished was a serious hinderance to the very
prepay ^ons needed to make it short,) the other is an error ■ equally
fatal;
paralysis of effort produced by the sentiment of the
probable k ^ngness of the war is sure to make it much longer than it
would other.
be- There is no higher duty, therefore, than for patri
otic men to k
themselves and others by the consideration of all
the elements m* hope and confidence which a retrospect of past prog
ress and a survey ’ of ,the Presenfc situation inspire.
Such a survey ik ratifies the conclusion that the end of the war—the
crushing of the armx 'd forces of the rebellion is not only not far off;
but that it is near at k ,and» and that is in our Power to bring it about
almost at a blow.
It will show the outlix '®$
a war continental in its proportions,
waged on a theatre equal C° the size of all Europe.
It will show armies the ^Tl'eatest the world ever saw, raised and
sustained by the spontaneous patriotism of a free people.
It will show how, by the pnj^®88
our arms, the area of the
rebellion has, step by step, been sk,orn
three-fourths of its propor
tions.
It will show the insurgent territory cut on from communication
with the outside world by a blockade .which dwarfs any on record,
and at the same time the most perfect of a ny on record.
It will show how every stronghold oir the coast has either been
captured or is now closely invested.
It will show the-interior of this territory cut UP by our great Jines
of conquest, bisected latterally and longitudinally;- and the dominion
of the confederacy left a kingdom of shreds and patches.
It will show a succession of battles of colossal magnitude, in three
fourths of which the Union arms have triumphed, and all of which,
whether victories or reverses, in a purely military point of view, have
redounded to the advance of the great cause.
It will show the manhood of a population defending free institu
tions, vindicating itself against years of the gibes and insolence born of
the plantation.
It will show the fighting population of the insurgent States reduced,
by battle, by disease, and by captures, from three fourths of a million to
between a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand men.
It will show this foree—the forlarn hope of the rebellion—separated
by an interval of a thousand miles, divided into two armies, the one
of which driven from Chattanooga to Atlanta, has at length been
compelled to give up that point, the material capital of the confederacy,
while the other is shut up in Richmond, the political capital of the
confederacy.
It will show that the annihilation of both these armies is a mathe
matical certainty, if we put forth the strength at our command.
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It will reveal, finally, as the result of all this, the radiant figure of
Peace hovering not afar off, and plainly visible through the cloud of
war that still overspreads the land.
If this be the magnificent result which we have to show for the
three years of war for the Union, it will give the people of the loyal
States a criterion of action in the great issue now before the country—
an issue that will determine whether by the maintenance of the Art
ministration under which the war. has been conducted to these results,
and which can alone carry it through, we are willing to crown and
justify all that has been done by a Peace that will vindicate and esta
blish forever the unity and integrity of the nation ; or whether we
shall surrender our destinies into the hands of a party committed to
a peace which makes the war for the Union amockery—a party whose
creed throws to the winds all that has been achieved by the toil arid
blood, the faith and the self-sacrifice of this nation, in the most terrible
war in the world’s history, whose creed casts disgrace on every soldier
under the sod, makes the heroic bones that on a hundred battle fields
render the continent sacred the monuments oi folly, which makes
every sailor that has gone down at his guns for the love of the old
flag a fool, and every man who wears the insignia of a glorious
wound a poor simpleton; a creed, finally, the ..elusive peace result
ing from which can only be the beginning of unending war.

n.
THE TASK LAID UPON THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE
WAR.
When overt war, begun by the firing on Fort Sumter in April,
1861, and brought to a head in the battle of Bull Run is the July
following, had fairly inaugurated the rebellion against the constituted
authorities of the United States, the Administration found itself com
mitted to a struggle conti nerMbin its proportions. The task imposed
upon it, as described in PresidSfet Lincoln’s inaugural, was to “ repos
sess the forts, places and property, which had been seized from the
Union.” But to do this it was needed that the embodied power of the
Government should sweep armed resistance from the whole territory
of the insurgent States. It is the nature of war like that of a confla
gration to involve and swallow up everything within its reach. The
Southern heart “ fired ” by a few powerful leaders, plunged into the
war with a recklessness akin to madness, and from the Ohio to the
gulf, from the Potomac to the Mexican border was all aglow with
red-hot rebellion^ The Government accepted the task put upon it, for
the people willed it, and it was the people’s war. Conscious of its
strength, arousing itself as a giant from slumber, the nation accepted
the gage of war for the Union.
There are, however, certain considerations which, little thought of
at the time, entered so deeply into the militaty problem then pre-'
sented, have so influenced the course of war and count for so much in
a proper estimate of what has been accomplished aS to demand im
mediate statement here. They all go to show that the task of quel
ling the rebellion was much mpre difficult than was conceived at the I
time or than is commonly apprehended even now.
ft is common fallacy in estimating the amount of force the Goy-
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ernment could bring to bear on the revolted States to state it merely
in the ratio of the population of the two sections:—twenty millions
in the loyal States against eight in the revolting States. But it is
proper to consider that the rebels had within themselves a slave popu
lation >of over four millions, an,d that this population was able to car
ry on all their simple industries, which it required more than double
that number to carry on the much more complicated industries of
northern civilization. It is thus apparent that the whole fighting white
population of the South was vailable for service in the field, while
nearly half of our own population was necessarily neutralized in the
way just mentioned. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the rebel
leaders were able to put into the afield, at the very start, armies nearly
equal to our own, though our own levies were unparalleled in history.
To this must be added the astonishing aseendancy which a small
minority of leading men had required over the southern population,
and by which, when they had once usurped power, they were able to
wield an absolutely despotic control over all the resources of men and
material in the South. These men, in fact, had long been preparing
for this war, as many of them publicly confessed after the inaugura
tion of the rebellion. “We have,” said Mr. Barnwell Rhett in a
speech in the convention which took South Carolina out of the
Union, “ we have been engaged in this war for more than thirty years.
It is no consequence of Lincoln's election or the failure to execu te the
fugitive slave law, but we have been ingaged in this war for more than
thirty years'' It is a thread-bare story how Buchanan’s infamous
secretary had, for the last twelve months of that administration, bent
all his energies to furnish forth the rebels with all they needed for
their premeditated treason. It is a matter of official record that by
the robbery of forts and arsenals, and by purchase from abroad,
Floyd had distributed at various convenient points throughout the
South 707,000 stands of arms and 200,000 revolvers. Even before
Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration there were thirty thousand men under arms
inthe South; and two days after that inauguration the Confederate
Congress passed a bill to raise an army of a hundred thousand men.
And this, bear in mind, was at a time when the United States Govern
ment had not under its control an organized force of five thousand
men.
To enhance the difficulty of the task imposed on the adminis
tration, the theory of the war into which it was driven by the very
nature of the contest was that of the offensive. Now military history
is replete with illustrations of the enormous advantage which a peo
ple has when able to stand at bay (covering its own communications
and holding interior lines) and await in chosen positions the attacks
of the enemy.
The career of Frederick the Great affords an eminent example of
a small nation, never able te raise an army of over a hundred thou
sand men, conducting a defensive war, (with offensive returns,) and
successfully resisting for seven years the attempts of a collision of five
of the leading Powers of Europe. But offensive operations against a
people holding such defensive attitude becomes ten fold more difficult
hen the war becomes what is ©ailed a “ national war,” the nature of
rich is thus depicted by the greatest modern writer on the theory of
r, General Jbmini;
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The difficulties in the path of an army in national wars are very great,
and render the mission of tie general conducting them very arduous.* ' The in
vader has only, an army; his adversaries have an army and a people wholly
or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of everything.
Each individual conspires against the common enemy—even the non-combatants
have an interest in his ruin, and accelerate it by every means in their power.
Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and connections-—he find*
everywhere a relative or friend who aids him ; the commanders also know the
country, and learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the
invader can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects.”

These embarrassments, enormously increased by the prodigious ex
tent of the theatre of war, the topography of which is all against the
offensive and in favor of the defensive (as witness the immense depth
of the lines of communicationsin any great aggressive movements,
the impossibility of supplying our armies from the country as is done
in Europe, etc.,) entered into the portentous problemwhich the admin
istration had to solve; and yet, in face of this accumulation of difficul
ties, forming a task the gravest that ever met an Executive, the war
has been pushed successfully through to the splendid results we witness
—the armies of the rebellion havebeen driven from the vast extent
of territory the rebels claimed till now the one is shut up in the States
bordering on the Gulf, and the other is besieged without ope of *
cape to Richmond.

in.
THE UPRISING OF THE NATION.

^The response of the people to the call of President Lincoln for
men with which* to execute the authority of the Government will
always remain one of the grandest manifestations of the spontaneous
energy of a free people in the vindication of free institutions. It was
then we saw that sublime “ uprising” of the people, when all party differencies were merged in enthusiastic devotion to the Union—or rather
when armed loyalty cowed and quelled secret traitors who, driven to
their lurking places, saw the prudence of awaiting some other oppor
tunity to show their hands.
After Bull Run had shown that an arduous and protracted war was
before us, Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation for 300,000 men. The
response of the North to the call was without a parallel in the history
of the world, and it was soon evident that more troops would be in
the field than the act of Congress authorized. Within fifteen days it is
estimated that 350,000 volunteers offered themselves in*defense of our
national flag. And from first to last, under the different calls, more than
a MILLION AND A HALF of men have been under arms in the war
for the Union. There is in history but one example of a similar upris
ing of the people in defense of its nationality, and that is the rushing
to arms of the French during the great revolution when threatened by
the eoalitaon. And yet the comparison only serves to show how far
even that fell short of what we have witnessed ; for modern historians
have proved that, notwithstanding all the exaggerations in regard to
the number of men raised by France at that epoch, the figure never
exceeded 500,000 men. Yet we have trebled that number.
The task now before the Government was herculean, and suchas
might have made even Jfapqlgon stand aghgpt. To raise and fit for
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the field an army of six hundred thousand men, to be supplied with
all the needs of a moderfl army, and that to© without even the skel
eton of a veteran force on which to build, was indeed a work of
frightful magnitude. And yet this was accomplished in the space of
three months—an achievement that has extorted the wonder and ad
miration of military men throughout the world.
IV.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.
As the chief force of the rebellion—the head and front of the
offending—was collected in Virginia, it became a necessity to place
here an army of proportions- fitting it to foil the purpose of the enemy
touching the capture of our capital, at the same time to drive the
opposing force out of Virginia.
With this view .a gramd army of over 200,000 men was collected at
Washington and placed under command of Major General G. B. Mc
Clellan, whose name, from a series of successful minor operations in
Western Virginia, which another than he had planned and executed,
had acquired a halo that did not properly belong to it. It was not
until sometime afterwards that that constitutional inactivity, which
seems to be a part of General McClellan’s nature, and that secret sym
pathy with treason that has always made him tender of hurting trai
tors, began to be appreciated, and hence it was that for many months
our armies were kept at a dead-lock, thus giving the rebels the oppor
tunity to prepare their plans, and the rebellion its best ally, time, and
we put in a position of humiliation before the world.
There was one result springing from the presence of our army in
Virginia, however, which even the generalship of McClellan could not
prevent; it thwarted the realization of those dreams of invasion that
had fired the southern imagination. A powerful party of red-hot bel
ligerents had made the carrying of the war into northern soil their ral
lying cry. Washington was in particular the object of their chief
desires, and their direst hate. The rebel Secretary of War boasted at
Montgomery, on the 12 th of April, that “ the flag which now flaunts
the breeze here will float over the dome of the old Capitol at Wash
ington before the 1st of July.”
After Bull Run the same ambition fired these men. Said the Rich
mond Examiner : “ From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores
of the sea there is one wild shout of firce resolve to capture Washing
ton city at all and every human effort.” But this “ wild shout of
fierce resolve” was vain against the 200,000 bayonets present to defend
the capital; and though the early history of our army in Virginia was
not of the character the people justly expected and the army eagerly
desired, it was at least something, in view of these desperate projects
of the rebels, that Washington, by its presence, was rendered safe.
But outside of the immediate influence of the McClellan strategy,
* a series of operations in the western theatre of war had been inaugu
rated, which laid the foundation of the splendid victories of the Union
arms in that quarter* While McClellan during the winter of 1861-2,
kept his magnificent armv of two hundred thousand men in inaction,
maturing plans which were never matured, the early pages of the his-
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tpry of the war were lit up by a succession of brilliant victories on the
Atlantic seaboard and west of the Mississippi river. Christmas of 1861
saw the powerful force of rebels, which had overrun Missouri, inso
lently proclaiming their purpose of seizing St. Louis, driven down
to the Arkansas border. General Grant had begun on a small scale
the operations on the Mississippi, destined to swell into campaigns of
colossal proportions. The first of our series of coast victories had been
gained at Hatteras inlet, (August 27,) giving us two forts, thirty-six
guns, six hundred and nineteen prisoners, and the key to Albemarle
sound. This was followed up, at the end of October, by Dupont’s
exploit at Port Royal, one of the most memorable triumphs on record
of ships over forte. The spoils of this victory included not less than
fifty cannon.
V.
THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.
The opening of the second year of the war was gilded by two other
victorieson the coast—the capture of Roanoke Island by a combined
attack of our land and naval forces, giving us six forts, 2,500 prison
ers and 42 guns, followed up promptly by the capture of Newbern
which added six other forts and 84 heayy guns. These conquests re
stored the sovereignty of ‘.he flag over all the inland waters of Norjth
Carolina, which, up to ‘ jis time, had been the main resort of the
whole crew of blockade runners. Another brilliant point in the
chain of coast victories was added by the reduction and capitulation
of Fort Pulaski following. With the fort were surrendered 47 guns
and 360 prisoners..; This gave us the control of the mouth of the
Savannah river.
Turning to the great theatre of war between the Alleghanies and
the Mississippi, the spring of 1862 saw there the inauguration of a
combination of magnificent operations by several distinct columns
drawn out from the Ohio to the mou^h of the Mississippi and destined
to carry their conquests into the very heart of the confederacy and re
claim the valley of the Mississippi to the soveignty of the Union.
The rebel line of defense on this frontier emended from Columbus,
a powerfully intrenched camp on the Mississippi, eastward to the Alle
ghany mountains. About midway was Bowling Green, another en
trenched camp, where Albert Sidney Johnson commanded in person.
East towards themountains was Zollicoffer with a large force, where
early in the winter he had taken up a fortified position on the Cum
berland river near Mill Spring.
Against this line defense Grant and the gunboats under Foote were
preparing to move on the west; Buell was advancing on Bowling
Green in the centre, while Thomas was in motion on the east near the
mountains. Thomas struck the first blow and gave the country the
firstlings of victory in the west. On the 19th of January he engaged
the rebels at Mill Spring defeated and routed them with the loss of
their artillery, their intrenched position, and their general, Zollicoffer,
killed. The effect of this victory was to expose the whole rebel right
flank by way of East Tennessee.
On the left flank Grant and Foote were moving to break the rebel
lines of defence- by the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. It was
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clearly seen that could these rivers be forced, the great rebel strong
holds at Columbus and Bowling Green would be taken in reverse and
their evacuation made a matter of absolute compulsion. But these
rivers was barred by two strong works—Fort Henry on the Tennesee
and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The former fell a prey to the
gallantry of Foote’s naval attack, surrendering on the 6th of February,
with its armament of sixty guns.
A wee^after the surrender of Fort Henry, General Grant drew his
lines of investment around Fort Donelson, and after a conflict running
through four days and nights, and rendered memorable by the hardest
fighting that yet'occurred in the war, the rebels were forced to accede
to General Grant’s demands for that 4‘ unconditional-surrender ” which
has become so inseparably associated with his name. The surrender
included fifteen thousand prisoners and forty pieces of artillery.
The fall of Forts Donelson and Henry promptly produced its an
ticipated effect Columbus, which the rebels had styled the “ Gibraltar
of America,” was immediately abandoned. At the same time Johnston
evacuated his intrenched position at Bowling Green and falling back
to Nashville, or rather through Nashville, (for the opening of the
Cumberland to our gunboats which resulted from the fall of the fort
made Nashville untenable;) General Buell, whose army had been
threatening the rebel force at Bowing Green, immediately- followed
up and took possession of that city. Thus it was that by the magnifi
cent series of successes that illustrated the spring of 1862, the rebel line
on a stretch of over five hundred miles was pushed back from the
Ohio to the Cumberland and Che whole state of Kentucky and a third
of Tennessee were recovered to the dominions of the Union.
Simultaneous with these operations the waters of the Mississippi
were lit up by the splendors of Farragut’s astonishing combat below
New Orleans with the forts, gunboats, steam rams, floating batteries,
fire rafts, obstructions, booms and chains which the rebels had prepared
for the defense of the great metropolis of the gulf, ending ih the
fall of that city, whose capture the London Times, doubting, with its
usual cynicism its possibility, had declared would be w putting the
toumequet on the main artery of the confederacy.”
After their retreat from Columbus the rebels under Folk took up
a new position on the Mississippi at Island No. Ten. This stronghold
was able for many weeks able to hold out against all the Operations
directed against it, till finally the gunboats run the gauntlet of the
batteries and the stronghold with a hundred heavy guns fell into our
hands. From this point they fell back to Memphis only to be com
pelled to abandon that city which in June following came under oontrol of the Union forces.
After the retreat of the central army of the rebellion from Nashville,
it took up a strongly fortified position at Corinth, under Beauregard.
There he was beseiged by the Union army under Halleck, whose siege
operations, pushed on to such a point as to make the capture of the
whole force a matter of high probability, compelled the evacuation
of this position also.
The result of the victories of 1862 was thus to leave the situation
in this gratifying positions Butler was at New Orleans, Curtis was
pushing his way to Little Rock, the capital of । Arkansas, the chief points
on the coast was in our hands, HaBeek was at Corinth, the Union
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flag waved over Memphis and Nashville, while Mitehell in Alabama
was advancing from victory to victory.
This was glory enough for one year, for if we turn our eye to the
theatre of war in the East, we are presented with the spectacle of a
campaign towards Richmond, in which the finest qualities of heroism
in the army, gaining victories wherever it met the armed enemy, and
driving him back to his capital were neutralized and rendered fruitless
by &e imbecility of its head. Turning upon McClellan, Lee termi
nated the offensive campaign by himself assuming the initiative, and
carrying his army for the first time into the territory of the loyal
States. The issue was at length tried out at Antietem, where the ab
sence of directing generalship could not prevent our soldiers from
winning a victory of which their commander had nqt the capacity to
take advantage. Neveitheless, the first invasion of the rebels ended
disastrously by their retreat into Virginia.

VI.
THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR—THE BATTLE SUMMER.

The first day of the third year of the war (1863) was signalized by
the battle of Stone River or Murfreesboro, fought by General Rose
crans on the Union side and by Bragg on the part of the rebels. The
most desperate battle of the war up to that period, it inaugurated the
year of great actions by an engagement which resulted in. placing our
army in Murfreesboro, with the prodigious loss to the enemy of 14,560
men. This was to bedbllowed up from this base by a brilliant cam
paign in Tennessee, destined to culminate in the possession of Chatta
nooga, which had long been recognized by military heads as the key
to the whole theatre of war in the West.
In the meanwhile General Grant was drawing his lines of invest
ment around the last great stronghold of the rebels on the Missis
sippi, at Vicksburg. After many attempts against this point, he
finally, by an audacious stroke of strategy, unparalleled save by Na
poleon’s passage of the Splugen, crossed his army over the Missis
sippi at Grand Gulf, and, dividing the army of Johnston from the
possibility of reinforcing the garrison at Vicksburg, beat the rebels in
half a dozen battles, and ended by throwing his army as a besieging
force around this position. The siege of Vicksburg will take its place
in history as among the most wonderful engineering operations on
record. It was crowned by its unconditional surrender on the. 4th of
July, with 31,720 prisoners and 234 guns. At the same time the
garrison at Port Hudson surrendered to General Banks, thus adding
7,000 prisoners and 40 pieces of artillery to the account. The effect
of these two victories was to restore the national authority along the
whole vast stretch of the Mississippi, and that great continental high
way was thrown open to its embouchure in the Gulf of Mexico.
At the very time that the right wing of our immense line of battle,
stretching from the Potomac to the Mississippi, was thus engaged, its
left wing, the army of the Potomac, was manoeuvering to meet Lee’s
second invasion of the loyal States. The rebel army was brought
to bay at length at Gettysburg where a three days battle, the most
colossal of the war was fought, ending in the utter defeat of Lee8 who
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was lain again to make good his retreat into Virginia with a loss of
23,000 in killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners.
The centre of our great line, held by General Rosecrans, was at
the same time on the advance. By a beautiful series of flanking move
ments, that commander drove Bragg from his two powerfully en
trenched positions at Shelbyville and Tulahoma, and advancing from
this point, planted his army, at one splendid stroke, in the central
citadel of the South—Chattanooga.
On the coast, the operations were being pushed on with equal vigor.
General GillmofS had effected a landing on Morris Island, whence,
with his long range seige-guns, he was able to batter down Fort Sum
ter, leaving that memorable stronghold, whose reduction by the rebels
was the first overt act of the war, a mass of ruins. Assisted by the
co-operation of the. iron-clad fleet, the works on Morris Island—Forts
Wagner and Gregg—were also reduced, and they with their armament
fell into our hands. The possession of Morris Island has enabled our
fleet ever since to keep up a blockade of Charleston which hermetically
seals that place.
Leaving out of view the single exception of that brief period dur
ing which the Napoleonic war involved all Europe in its conflagra
tion, you will search all history in vain for a parallel of that great
battle summer, whether as respects the vastness of the theatre of war,
the proportions of the contending forces, or the substantial greatness
of the results. During a single period of thirty days embraced in
this titanic epoch, not less than sixty thousand prisoners were captured.
The losses to the enemy in this respect, added to his prodigious sacri
fices in killed and wounded, left the Confederacy at the close of the
year bleeding, prostrate, and exhausted.

VII.
THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.
The opening of the fourth year of the war saw the forces of the
rebellion driven from the whole circumference of the Confederacy,
and brought to definite pointsjn two armies—the army of Bragg
on the mountain ridges south of Chattanooga, and the army of Lex
on the Rapidan. The former assailed by General Grant in his moun
tain fastnesses, saw himself driven from his stronghold, and his arm;
broken and routed in the most disastrous defeat since Waterloo. He
left in our hands 10,000 prisoners and 60 guns, suffered a loss of
8,000 in killed and wounded, and sought shelter for his shattered force
by a disordered retreat to Dalton.
^This review brings the catalogue of Union victories up to the
time of the commencement of the great campaign of this summer,
the events of which are too fresh in the memory of all to require any
detailed recital.
During the early days of May ftie two grand armies of the Union,
under, the supreme control, of the Lieutenant General commandim
all the armies of the United States, began their advance—the on
from Chattanooga the other fromthe Rapidan.
General Sherman a ;er an advance from Chattanooga, over a hun
dred miU’, marked »y a series of brilliant manoeuvres and actions s
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in which the enemy’s force was driven from a succession of strong
holds looked upon as impregnable, at length planted his army in front
of Atlanta. Here he was thrice assailed by an enemy willing to lavish
everything in the desperate effort to drive him back.
- JThe enemy thrice met a bloody repulse. Sherman now began work
ing slowly but surely round on the rebel communications, not with a
view to take. Atlanta simply, but for the purpose of capturing the rebel
army—a result from which Hood has only been saved by a precipitate
flight from Atlanta—thus abandoning the foremost city of the South
west, and the important communications it commands. In the en
gagement which resnlted in-this brilliant success, the rebels lost two
thousand prisoners and very heavily in killed and wounded. It may
now be safely said that Hood’s force, as am army, no longer exists.
In this great campaign General Sherman has put hors du combat
over forty thousand men, that is, more than half the army opposed to
him, besides affecting great captures in men and material.
General Grant has planted his army before Petersburg and on the
communications of Richmond, after a campaign of even greater magni
tude, marked by the most terrible and continuous fighting on record.
During its progress he has gained a dozen victories, any one of which
would have sealed the fate of any European war. Its course has been
marked by the constant use of those double instruments of war—strat
egy and what,Wellington called “hard pounding;” by the former
he has driven the enemy, by bloodless victories on our part, from six
chosen lines of defense; by the latter he has put out of the way be
tween fifty and sixty thousand of the fighting veterans of the South.
In addition he has taken over twenty-five thousand prisoners, and a
prodigious number of guns. He is certain, ere long, to crown his
work by the capture of the rebel capital and the destruction of the
main rebel army.
Finally, while the situation is as thus presented at the main points
of war, the progress of our arms by land and sea shows equal lustre
wherever they meet the foe. It is but the other day that Admiral Far
ragut capped the climax of his great achievements by the capture of
the forts guarding the entrance to Mobile bay, the destruction or
capture of the enemy’s powerful fleet in those waters—thus sweeping
away, it is believed, the last vestige of rebel naval power on the coast
of the Atlantic and the Gulf. From the high seas, teo, the rebel naval
power has been swept. It is but the other day that its most formid
able embodiment, the Alabama, was sent to the bottom by the Kearsage, affording a significant lesson both to the rebels and to the British
allies who have furnished them with that and ether proofs of their
material support.
VIII.

#

GROUWS OF COURAGE AND CONFIDENCE.

After such a retrospect cf the glorious achievements of our army
and navy, have we not a right to ask, with some emphasis, of those
who complain of the slew progress of the war, and fear its indefinite
prolongation, what substantial ground they have for then -repining ? It
18 true the course of the war has not been an uninterrupted succession
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©f victories; it has presented the checquered aspect of successes and
reverses which all wars present But we ask any dispassionate obse
rver, looking at the war by the map, and in the fiery characters in
which it is writ all over the continent—contrasting the rebellion at the
start with the rebellion where it now stands—surveying this great
struggle for the Union in its solid and substantial results—we ask such
an observer to point out in the annals, of war where more has been
done in the same period. He will find it hard to point out where
as much has been done ! It is the common practice we know in war
of poprdar Governments for men to belittle what has been done, to criti
cise and complain ; but we ask in all seriousness is it the part of dignity
or of patriotism, in this crisis of our nation’s struggle, to depreciate
its grand and providential achievements ?
There is to a people battling in any cause a force, purely metaphy
sical in its character, which is yet stronger than the sinews of war—
stronger than the sinews of men’s ari^s. It is courage. Never has
it been more needed than of late, when a fatal paralysis has benumb
ed the public sense, and in the eclipse of faith, “ the whole noise of
timorous and flocking birds, with those that love the twilight, flutter
about, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects
and schisms.”
I believe we have already touched the nadir of our fears and our
despondency, and that a breath of patriotism and hope is now vivify
ing the national pulse. But each man can swell the rising tide. To
diffuse the inspiration of courage is the duty of every patriot. And
happily we need draw this inspiration from no illusive fountains; for'
the more earnestly and honestly we look at the situation, the more
grounds of hope we find. Some of these grounds can be briefly set
down:
1. The body of the rebellion is moribund. Gen. T. Seymour, whose
critical habit of thought and conservative temper, add a prodigious
weight to any declarations he makes on this head, states as the result
of his three months’ observation in the interior of the South, that “iAe
rebel cause is fast failing from exhaustion^ This is profoundly true,
whether it has regard to the material resources in the South, or to the
still more vital resources in men, of which the field is now reaped and
bare. Every man and every boy is now in the field ; there is nothing
behind. In a private letter lately written by General Grant, he used
the pungent expression that the rebels have 11 robbed the cradle and. the
grave to reinforce their armies.”
2. It is true, in inflicting on the rebels the immense damage 'they
have received in the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman, we also
have lost quite as severely—perhaps even more so; but (if it is lawfal to
speak thus of so grave a matter) we can afford it. We can stand to
Iq^e man for man, till every man in the armies of the rebellion is put
hors du combat, and leave behind untouched a force eqyal to all we
have lost in thblvar.
3. But I do not believe it will be needful to wade through such an
ocean of blood as this. All that is needed is a blow that will disrupt
the two main rebel armies. It is worthy of note, that the merciless
conscriptions that have swept over the South have even simplified the
problem for v . The war has.no longer those thousand-fold embar
rassments th «t attend a national war, or war on populations. There is
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no population. Our task is confined to beating the armies at Rich
mond and Atlanta. For the rest, the southern people are tired of the
war, and are sighing for peace.
4. In a military point of view,?such is the situation held by Gen.
Grant and Gen. Sherman, toward’the insurgent forces opposed to them,
that the reinforcements they are receiving, will certainly enable them
soon to complete their work. Gen. Seymour on this head, says :
“There is but one course consistent with safety or honor. Let the people
awake to a sense of their dignity and strength, and a few months of compara
tively trifling exertion—of such effort as alone is worthy of the great work—
and thh rebellion will crumble before us. Fill this draft promptly and willing
ly, with good and true men ; send a few spare thousands over rather than un
der the call, and the summer sun of 1865 will shine upon a regenerated land”

5. The war is really near its close. The present front of the rebel
lion, menacing though it be, is i eally nothing more than a mask, con
cealing the hollowness and rottenness within. The South is literally
exhausted—exhausted of that without which it is impossible to<carry
on war—exhausted of men. The field, in the impressive expression
of Napoleon regarding France after her three conscriptions, is reaped
down to the stubble. Out of, an available fighting population of
upwards of three-quarters of a million with which the war was inaug
urated, they have saved an effective force of one hundred or one hun
dred and fifty thousand men. The rest are in their graves, in the
hospitals, disabled, or prisoners in our hands. These are the forlorn
hope of the rebellion.
6. Our territorial conquests have reclaimed three-fourths of the area
originally claimed in the limits of the Confederacy. The Confederacy
stands now thrice bisected—its great lines of communication cut or
in our hands. Besides, its resources of all kinds are all but exhausted.
The desperate men at its head may continue the struggle for some
time longer—they may for a while oppose a formidable front to our
blows—but the rebellion is doomed. Its struggles will be the frantic
final efforts of the gladiator before he falls down exhausted and exan
imate.
7. The leaders of the rebellion have ceased to see any hope for
their cause in the arena of war. They are looking now to the arena of
politics. A party has been set up whose creed and aims have their
entire sympathy and moral support. Hie platform of that party has
noising but expressions of contumely for the sacred war, the recital of
which has been made 5 for Jeff. Davis and his crew it has nothing but
expressions of-sympathy and respect. The people of the North have
now before them the momentous question of determining by teir
action whether tirey wiM justify all the precious blood shed in this war
by carrying; it triumphantly through and crowning it wafch & gforibus
and honorable peace, or whether by a base surren
they w"' ’"project
it into history as the monument of a nation’s folly.
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15. Evidences of a Copperhead Conspiracy in the Northwest.
The above documents will be printed in English and German
in. eight or sixteen page pamphlets, and sent, postage free, accord
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